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BIGSBY V. JOHNSON.

[18b. (2d)

Nov. 1941.]

by the statute to be "every person engaged in the business
of making sales at retail. . . . " (Deering's Gen. Laws
[1935], .Act 8493, sec. 2 [e].) Under the circumstances of
the present case, there can be no question but that the sale
involved was a "sale at retail" within the statute since such
a sale is defined to be "a sale to a consumer or to any person
for any purpose other than for resale in the form of tangible
personal property. . . . " (Deering's Gen. Laws [1935J,
.Act 8493, sec. 2 [c].)
.Admitting that this transaction constitutes a retail sale
within the tax statute, plaintiff relies upon the argument
that the sale of the used MonomeIt pot was merely a casual
and incidental sale to which the retail sales tax was never
intended to apply. Defendant points out, however, that
plaintiff held a permit to engage in the business of making
sales of any kind at retail and that he was clearly a "retailer" within the meaning of the statute, so far as the bulk
of his business operations was concerned., (Deering's Gen.
Laws [1935], .Act 8493, sec. 2 [b]; see Revenue and Taxation
Code, sec. 6006; People ex rel. Walker Engraving Oorp. v.
Graves, 243 .App. Div. 652 [276 N. Y. Supp. 674] ; aff'd 268
N. Y. 648 [198N. E. 539J; People ex. reZ. Foremost Studio
Inc. v. Graves, 246 .App. Div. 130 [284 N. Y. Supp. 906] ; Ousick v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 204 [84 S. W. (2d) 14] ; Long
v. Roberts &- Son, 234 .Ala. 570 [176 So. 213].) Since plaintiff can be classified generally as a "retailer," it is urged by
defendant that any sale at retail by such a person is taxable
under the statute, whether a sale of the kind ordinarily made
in the course of his business or not. This is said to follow
from the fact that section 3, supra, measures the tax which it
places Upon retailers by gross receipts from the sale "of all
tangible personal property." (Italics ours.)
[1] The question arises, therefore, whether the legislature
intended to include in the measure of the tax the receipts from
those retail sales of a retailer that are incidental and casual,
as well as from the retail sales that are made in the ordinary
course of business. .Although most jurisdictions imposing
sales taxes specifically exempt casual or isolated sales, a majority of them hold that the exemption does not include
casual retail sales made in the Course of business operations
by one who is engaged in the retail sales business. (PrenticeHall, State & Local Tax Service, pars. 92,572, 92,953.) The
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tax is imposed upon retailers for the privilege of doing a
retail sales business (Western Lithograph 00. v. State Board
of Equalization, 11 Cal. (2d) 156, 164 [78 Pac. (2d) 731,
117 .A. L. R. 838]), and the measure of the tax is the gross
receipts of any such retailer from the sale of "all tangible
personal property sold at retail. ... " (Act 8493, sec. 3.)
The plaintiff is a retailer. He sold the personal property in
question at retail as a part of his business operations,and
the plain language of the act requires the inclusion of the
gross receipts therefrom in the measure of the tax. He' can
claim no exemption merely by virtue of the fact that the sale
of used printing equipment was not the kind of retail sale
ordinarily made by him. Our statute creates no exemption
covering the situation, and however' forceful ,may . be plaintiff's contention that this type of sale should be exempted
from the operation of the statute, such arguments must be
directed to the legislature rather than to the courts.
Weare not required, under the facts of this case, to decide
the question raised in the briefs as to the taxability under'
the statute of gross receipts from casual retail sales that
have no relation whatever to a retailer's business operations.
The judgment is reversed.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J.,
concurred.

[8. F. No. 16608. In

Bank.~Nov.

1, 1941.]

JOELENE DONNELLY, Respondent, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY -(a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Commeree-Regulation-By State.-In the absence of con-

trary congressional legislation a state may by statute or judicial decision establish rules affecting interstate commerce
so long as such commerce is not unduly burdened. But a
statute enacted by Congress which covers the subject of the
state's regulation supersedes the state statute or decision.
MeR:. Dig. References: 1,2,4. Commerce, § 3; 3. Carriers, § 88;
5. Negligence, § 3; 6. Negligence, § 8; 7,8. Negligence, § 7; 9,10.
Carriers, § 74.
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[2] Id.-Regulation-By State-Effect of Federal Act Embracing
General Field.-A statute enacted by Congr<'ss that embraces
the general field but does not cover the matter on which the
state has ruled supersedes the state's statute or decision
affecting interstate commerce only if Congress intended by
such legislation to occupy the entire field, thereby excluding
all state control. In such case, the state courts are then
bound by the federal decisional law in the field.
[Sa,3b] Carriers-Carriage of Passengers-Personal InjuriesGratuitous Transportation-Hepburn Act.-The Hepburn Act
(34 U. S. Stats. at Large, p. 544; 49 U. S. C. A. § 1) was intended to occupy the entire field of free passes. It supersedes
all state law in the field and the decisions of the federal courts
are, therefore, controlling on 'the liability of a carrier for
negligence to the holder of a pass containing an exculpatory
provision.
.
[4] Commerce-Regulation-Federal Act as Superseding State
Rule.-Generally an act of Congress is not regarded as superseding a state' statute or decision unless the two conflict or
the state law stands in the way of congressional objectives.
[5] Negligence-Definition.-N egligence is an unintentional tort,
a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation
that a reasonable man under similar circumstances would
exercise to protect others from harm.
[6] Id.-"Wilfulness"-Wanton Misconduct.-A negligent person
must be distinguished from a person guilty of wilful misconduct. A tort occurring when a person with no intent to
cause harm intentionally performs an act so unreasonable
and dangerous that he knows, or should know,that it is
highly probable that harm will result, is most accurately
designated as wanton and reckless misconduct. Such misconduct is more closely akin to wilful misconduct than to negligence, and it has most of the legal consequences of wilful
misconduct. . Such misconduct is characterized by the federai
courts as "wilful and wanton negligence."
[7] Id.-Degrees of Negligence-Rule in the Federal Courts.
The federal courts recognize no degrees of negligence. While
there may be different standards of care in different circumstances, the failure to exercise' such care in each case constitutes no more than negligence.

.[8] Id.-DegrE)es ofNegligence~Itule in California.-While Cali~
. fornia courts distinguish between ordinary and gross negligence, this' distinction amounts to a rule of policy that a
faihire .to exercise due care in those situations where the

risk of harm is great will give rise to legal consequences
harsher than those arising from negligence in less hazardous
situations.
[9] Carriers-Carriage of Passengers-Tickets and Fares-Limitation of Liability for Negligence.-The federal courts recognize the validity of a release of a carrier from liability for
negligence, including what in California would constitute
gross negligence, and hold such a release inapplicable only
in case of wanton and reckless misconduct as distinguished
from negligence.
[10] Id.-Carriage of Passengers-Tickets and Fares-Limitation
of Liability for Negligence-Injury from Act of Switchman.
Under the rule obtaining in the federal courts, a provision
in a pass releasing a carrier from liability for injury to the
person using it exempts the carrier from liability for injuries
sustained in a collision resulting from the act of a switchman
in throwing a' switch the wrong way where it does not, ap...
pear that he intended so to throw it or that he knew that
he was throwing it the wrong way, in other words, where
he was not guilty of reckless and wanton misconduct.

,APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala.(' meda County. S. Victor Wagler, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained in a
railroad collision by a person traveling on a free pass. Judg;.
ment for plaintiff reversed.
Elliott Johnson for Appellant.
Hildebrand & Bills and James R. Agee for

Respondent~

TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, the wife of ,an employee ·of the
Southern Pacific Railroad, was traveling on a free pass from
.El Paso, Texas, to Sacramento, California, aboard a Southern
Pacific train when it collided with an eastbound train standing upon a siding in California. Pl~intiff brought this action
against the railroad to recover damages for personal injurieS
suffered in the collision. The complaint alleges, and, the
,answer admits, that before the collision one of defendant '8
employees, in the course of his employment, set improperly
the switch that controlled the siding, causing the westbound
. 10.

See 4 Cal. Jur. 920; 10 Am. Jur. 115.
180. (2d)-28
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train to turn into the siding and collide with the eastbound
train. No evidence was introduced on the question of negligence. The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover from the d.efendant only if the switchman
was grossly negligent in, setting the ~witch. It defined gross
negligence as "that entire want of care which would raise a
presumption of conscious indifference to consequences; an
entire want of care, or such a slight degree of care as to
justify the belief that there was an entire disregard for and
indifference to the safety and welfare of others." The jury
returned a, verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and defendant
has appealed from the judgment.
The free pass on which plaintiff was traveling contained
the following condition: "The person accepting and using
this pass, in consideration of using the same, agrees that the
Southern Pacific Company shall not be liable under any circumstances for any injury to the person, or for any loss or
damage to the property of the individual using the pass;
and that as to such person the Company shall not be considered as a common carrier or liable as such." Plaintiff
contends that this provision releases the defendant from
liability for ordinary negligence, but not gross negligence,
and that the jury was justified in finding the switchman
guilty of gross negligence. Defendant asserts that the provision is a release from liability for any sort of negligence,
ordinary or gross; that the provision is inapplicable only in
the case of wilful or wanton misconduct, and that there is no
evidence to justify a finding that the switchman was guilty
of wilful or wanton misconduct.
California by statute has provided that" a common carrier
cannot be exonerated, by any agreement made in anticipation
thereof, from liability for the gross negligence, fraud or
willful wrong of himself or his servants." (Civil Code,
sec. 2175.) rrhis court has held that the improper setting of
an open switch may constitute gross negligence rendering the
railroad liable to a passenger traveling on a free pass who
is irijured in the resulting 'accident. (Walther v. Southern
,Pacific 00., 159 Cal. 769 [116 Pac. 51, 37 L. R . .A'.. (N. S.)
235] .)
[1] Plaintiff, however, was traveling in interstate com'merce. The question presented therefore is whether the
California statute and decision can validly apply to rail-
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roads engaged in interstate commerce. In,the';'absence')of
contrary congressional legislation a state may ;by statute or
judicial decision establish rules affecting intersta.te ·commer~e
so long as such commerce is not unduly burdened.i(Port
Richmond etc. Ferry 00. v. Freehaldersof Hudson Dounty,
234 U. S. 317 [34 Sup. Ct. 821, 58 L. Ed. 1330] ; Geer:v.
Oonnecticut, 161 U. S. 519 [16 Sup~ Ct. 600;40 n. Ed~ 793]';
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461[15 SUp!: Ct., 154,
39 'L. Ed~ 223] ; Oooley v. Board of Port 'Wardens, 12 H'ow.
299 [13 L. Ed. 996] ; Ohicago, R. I. &- P. Ry. Co.v. Maucher,
248 U. S. 359 [39 Sup. Ct. 1.08, 63 L. Ed. :294] ; !Ohicago M.
& St. P. Ry. 00. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133 '[18 Sup.Ct.'289,.42
L. Ed. 688] ; Pennsylvania R. R. 00. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477
[24 Sup. Ct. 132, 48 L. Ed. 268].) If a statut'e'is enacted
by Congress covering the subject of the state's'regnlati6n; it
supersedes the state statute or decision. '(Southe'rn Ry. 00.
v. Railroad Oommission of IndiaM, 236 U. ·S~ 439', [35 Sup.
Ct. 304, 59 L. Ed. 661] ; Southern Express Do. v; Byers, 24.0
U. S. 612 [36 Sup. Ct. 410, 60 L~ Ed. 825] {Adams Express
00. v. Oroninger, 226 U. S. 491 [33 Sup. Ot:: 148, ,57 L.Ed.
314]; Western Union Tel. 00. v. Speight,: 254' U~' S. 17 [41
Sup. Ct. 11, 65 L. Ed. 104]. See Western Union Tel. 00. v.
Oommercial M~1ling 00., 218 U. S. 406 [31 Sup. Ct. 59, 54
L. Ed. 1088]. See 30 Ill. L. Rev. 373; 41 Harv. L. Rev. 200.)
[2] 'If, however, Congress enacts a statute that embraces
the general field but does not cover the matter on which the
state has ruled, the state statute or decision is superseded
only if Congress intended by such legislation to occupy the
entire field, thereby excluding all state control. (Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. 00. v. Railroad Oom. of Gal., 283 U. 8.'380 '[51
Sup. Ct. 553, 75 L. Ed. 1128]; Kelly v. Washington, 302
U. S. 1 [58 Sup. Ct. 87, 82 L. Ed. 3] ; H.P."W'elch Oo.::~.
New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79 [59 Sup. Ct. 438; S3L., Ed.
500] ; Kansas Oity So. Ry. 00. v. Van Zant, 260 !U~ S. 459
[43 Sup. Ct. 176, 67 L. Ed. 348] ; Southern Express Co.v.
Byers, supra; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra; Western Union Tel. 00. v. Speight, supra; Postal Tel.-Oable 00.
v. Warren-Godwin Lumber 00., 251 U. S. 27 [40 Sup. Ct. 69,
64 L. Ed. 118] ; see Ohicago M. & St. P. Ry. 00. v. Solan,
supra; Ohicago R. 1. & P. Ry. Co. v. Maucher, supra; Pennsylvania R. R. 00. v. Hughes, supra.) The state courts are
then bound by federal decisional law':in the field. (Kansas
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City So. Ry. Co. v. Van Zant, supra; Southern Express Co.
v. Byers, supra; Adams Express 00. v. Oroninger, supra;
Western Union Tel. 00. v. Speight, supra.)
[3a] In 1906 Congress passed the Hepburn Act (34 U. S.
Stats. at Large, 544 [49 U. S. C. A., § 1]) regulating the
issuance of free passes by interstate car"riers. The act deals
only with the classes of persons to whom free passes may be
issued and contains nothing about the liability of carriers· to
such passengers, nor the terms of the passes. [4] Generally an act of Congress is not regarded as superseding a
state statute or decision unless the two conflict or the state
law stands in the way of congressional objectives. (R. P.
Welch 00. v. New Hampshire, supra; Kelly v.Washington,
supra; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Railroad Oom. of Cal.,
s'u,pra; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 [60 Sup. Ct. 726,
84 L. Ed. 969] ; Palmer V. Massachusetts, 308 U: S. 79 [60 Sup.
Ct. 34, 84 L. Ed. 931.) [3b] Nothing in the Hepburn Act
conflicts with state rules on liability for negligence, and it sets
forth no objective that would be hindered by the application
of. state law. Nevertheless the Supreme Court of the United
States took the position in Kansas Oity Southern Ry. 00. V.
Van Zant, supra, that the Hepburn Act was intended to
occupy the entire field of free passes, that it superseded all
state law in the field, and that the decisions of the federal
courts were therefore controlling on the liability of a carrier
for negligence to a holder of a pass containing an exculpatory
provision. This court is bound by that decision and must
therefore disregard the California law and .apply the rules
established by the decisions of the federal courts.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that
a carrier may validly contract to release itself from liability for negligence to the holder of a free pass. (Northern
Pacific Ry. CO. V. Adams, 192 U. S. 440 [24 Sup. Ct., 408,
48 L. Ed. 513]; Boering v. OhesapBake Beach R. 00., 193
U. S. 442 [24 Sup. Ct. 515, 48 L. Ed. 742]; Oharleston &
Western Oarolina Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 234 U. S. 576 [34
Sup. Ct. 964, 58 L. Ed. 1476]; Kansas City Southern Ry.
Co. v. Van Zant, supra; see Smith V. Atchison, T. &- S. F. Ry.
00. (C. C. A. 8), 194 Fed. 79 [114 C. C. A. 157] ; Ellis v. Davis
(C. C. A. 5) ~ 4 Fed. (2d) ·323.) The federal courts have
indicated, however, that a carrier may not 'protect itself from
liability for "willful and wanton negligence." (New York
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Oentral R. R. Co. v. 1J10hney, 252 U. S. 152 [40 Sup. Ct. 287;
64 L. Ed. 502]; Virginia Beach Bus Line v. Oampbell
(C. C. A. 4), 73 Fed. (2d) 97, cert. den. 294 U. S. 727 [55
Sup. Ct. 637, 79 L. Ed. 1258] ; see Northern Pac. Ry. 00. v.
Adams, supra; Bush v. Bremner, 36 Fed. (2d) 189; Smith
v. Atchison, T. &- S. F. Ry. 00., supra.) It is therefore neces..
sary to determine what is meant by "willful and wanton
negligence. "
[5] Negligence is an unintentional tort, a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable
man under similar circumstances would exercise to protect
others from harm. (Rest. Torts, secs. 282, 283, 284; Prosser,
Torts, secs. 30 et seq.) [6] A negligent person has no
desire to cause the harm that results from his carelessness,
(Rest. Torts, sec. 282 (c», and he must be distinguished from
a, person guilty of willful misconduct, such as assault and
battery, who intends to cause harm. (Prosser, Torts, p.
261.) Willfulness and negligence are contradictory terms.
(Kelly v. Malott, 135 Fed. 74 [67 C. C. A. 548]; Neary V~
Northern Pac. R. Co., 41 Mont. 480 [110 Pac. 226] ; Michels
v; Boruta, (Tex. Civ. App.) 122 S. W. (2d) 216.) If conduct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it is not
negligent. It is frequently difficult, however, to characterize
conduct as willful or negligent. A tort having some of the
characteristics of hoth negligence and willfulness occurs
when a person with no intent to cause harm intentionally
performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he
knows, or should know, it is highly probable that harm will
result. (Rest. Torts, sec. 500 et seq.; Prosser, 'Torts, pp~:
260, 261.) Such a tort has: been Libeled "willful 'negligence, ' , , , wanton and willful negligence,"; :',' wa.nton ··i:ind;
willful misconduct, " and even" gross rieglig~nc'e)";" It is 'Jh6si
accurately' designated as wanton and ·reckless~-mi~conduct.;
It involves 110· intention, as does willful misconduct, tod()\
harm, and it differs from negligence in that it does involve;an intention to perform an act that the actorkn(jws, or should\;
know, will very probably causeh3J.'m. (See Kastel v. Stieber,"
215 'Cal. 37, 46 [8 Pac. (2d) 474]; Albersv. '8h~lZ·Oo.!ol
Calif., 104 Cal. App. 733 [286 Pac. 752'1 ; Tognazz'iniv. Freeman, 18 Cal. App: 468 [123 Pac. 540] ; 45 C. 'J.674~} , Wan-'
ton and reckless misconduct is more closely akin to willful
misconduct than •to negligence, and it has most of the legal
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consequences of willful misconduct. 'Thus, it justifies an
award of punitive damages, and contributory negligence by
the plaintiff is not a defense. (See cases cited in Prosser,
Torts, p. 261.)
This is the type of misconduct that the federal courts
characterize as "willful and wanton negligence." In New
York Oentral R. R. 00. v. Mohney, supra, an engineer ran
his train past two separate danger signals and it crashed
into a train ahead. The collision resulted in injury to plaintiff, who was traveling on a free pass containing. a provision
releasing the railroad from liability for negligence. The
State Court of Appeals found the engineer guilty of willful
and wanton negligence, and the United States Supreme Court
held the railroad liable, despite the release in the pass, on
the ground that there was sufficient evidence to support the
state court's finding of willful and wanton negligence. A
railroad engineer who has deliberately run his train past
two .danger signals has intentionally performed so dangerous
an act that he must have known that harm would probably
result, and he is guilty of wanton and reckless misconduct
rather than negligence. In Virginia Beach Bus Line' v.
Oampbell, 73 Fed. (2d) 97, plaintiff, a holder of a free pass
with a release provision, was injured by' a collision, at a
dangerous crossing between the bus in which he was riding
and a railroad train. The court permitted him to recover
against the defendant bus company on the ground that the
negligence of the driver in operating the bus at a rate of
from 55 to 60 miles per hour over a dangerous railroad crossing was willful and wanton. Such. conduct constitutes more
than negligence. It is a dangerous act performed intentionally with the knowledge that it will probably cause harm.
[7] Plaintiff contends that while the release is effective
as to ordinary negligence, it is not effective as to gross negligence. The federal courts, however, have rejected any distinction between negligence and gross negligence; they recognize no degrees of negligence. (N ew York Oentral Ra1,'lroad
00. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 [21 L. Ed. 627]; Steamboat
New World v. King, 16 How. 469 [14 L. Ed. 1019]; Milwaukee db St. PaulRy. Go. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, 494' [23 L.
Ed. 374] ; Westre v. OhicagoM. db St. Paul Ry. 00., 2 Fed.
(2d) 227, and cases there cited.) If a person fails to exercise
the degree of care that the law requires him to exercise under

Nov. 1941.]
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the circumstances, he is negligent. There may be different
standards of care in different circumstances but the failure to
exercise such care in each case constitutes no more than negligence. (See Salmond, Torts (8th ed.), 461; Pollock, Torts
(13thed.), 457; Prosser, Torts, 256 et seq.; 1 Bevan, Negli~
gence (4th ed.), 15; Harper, Law of T6rts,1~6fl Street~
Foundations of Legal Liability, 9'9; Elliott, Degrees'of Negli~
gence, 6 So: Cal. L. Rev. 91.) Persons deali~gwith ,dang~rous
instrumentalities involving great risk of harm 'must' ~xercis~
a greater amount of care than, persons acting . in, less' ~e~
sponsible capacities, but the former,' are"no 'm:o~~,·riegiigeri.t
than the latter for failing to exercise the required" ca'r~'.
(See cases cited in 45 C. J. 665, footn'ote,78:r,~ccThere'iare
no 'degrees' of care, as a matter of law; th~re:'a~~ 'only :ciif~
ferentamounts of care, as a matter of fact (Ei:hd 'iross'
negligence is the same thing as ordinary negli¢ence", 'with
the addition', as Baron Rolfe put it, 'of' 'a;, v{ttiperati~e
epithet '. Wilson v. Brett (1843), 11M. & W. 113, 116; 152
Eng. Rep. 737." (Prosser, Torts, pp. 258,259.), As stated
by the United States Supreme Court in the!Jockwood case,
supra: "We have already adverted to the tendency of judicial
~ opinion adverse to the distinction between gross and ordinary
, negligence.... In each case, the negligence, whatever
epithet we give it, is failure to bestow the care and skill which
the situation demands, and hence it is more strictly accurate
perhaps to call it simply 'negligence'."
[8] Some jurisdictions, including California,' distinguish
between ordinary and gross negligence., (Kastel 'v. Stieber,
215 Cal. 37 [8 Pac. (2d) 474]; Albers v.. Shell Go. of Galif.,
104 Cal. App. 733 [286 Pac. 752] ; Walther v. Southern Pacific 00., 159 Cal. 769 [116 Pac. 51, 37 L. R. A. (N. :S. )235] ;
see 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91, 127.) This distinction amounts to
a rule of policy that a failure to exercise due care in those
situations where the risk of harm is great will give rise to
legal consequences harsher than those arising from negligence
in less hazardous situations. (See Walther v. Southern Pacific 00., supra.) [9] The federal rule, however, clearly
recognizes the validity of a release from liability for negligence, including what in California would constitute' gross
negligence, and holds such a release inapplicable onlyin the
case of wanton and reckless misconduct as distinguished from
negligenc~
,
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[10] In the present case the alleged conduct of the switchman does not constitute wanton and reckless misconduct'.
There is no allegation that he intended to throw the switch
,the wrong way. Apparently, he did not know he was throwing the switch the wrong way and that harm would probably
result. He was guilty of negligence alone. This negligence
may have been "gross" under the California rule, but th~
federal cases are clear that such dereliction constitutes negl!:.
gence and not wanton and reckless misconduct. "It would
be going a great way to say that the failure of the switch
tender to throw the switch so that the train wouid go on
the main line was a wanton and malicious neglect. The only
thing that can be said is that some one was careless, and
that is admitted . " (Shelton v. Oanadian Northern Ry . Oo~,
189 Fed . 153, 160; see Mt'lwaukee & St. Paul Ry . 00. v. Arms,
supra . ) There is therefore no basis for a finding of reckless
and wanton misconduct.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.

[8 . F. No. 16414. In Bank.-Nov. 1, 1941.J

THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. EDDIE LIM, Respondent.
[1] Nuisances-Power of Legislature-Authority of Courts.-The
legislature, within the constitutional limits of its powers,
may declare any act criminal and make the repetition or continuance thereof a public nuisance, and it may vest in courts
of equity the power to abate it by injunction. But it is not
the province of the courts to ordain such jurisdiction for
themselves.

1. Constitutionality of statute conferring on chancery courts
power to abate public nuisances, notes, 5 A. L. R. 1474; 22 A. L. R.
542; 75 A. L. R. 1298. See, also, 14 Cal. Jur. 242; 28 Am. Jur.
338.
McK. Dig. References: 1, 2. Nuisances, § 3; 3. Nuisances, § 35 ;
4, 6. Gaming, § 4; 5. Nuisances, § 49; 7. Pleading. § 90 (3).

[2] Id.-Power of Legislature-Policy as to NecessitY for Legis~
lative DeCIa,ration.-HNuisance" is a term which does not
:have a fixed content either at common law or at the present
time and, therefore, reasons of policy require that the responsibilityfor establishing those standards of public morality, the: violations of which are to constitute public nuisances
within equity's jurisdiction, should be left with the legislature.
[3] Id. - Equitable Relief - Where Nuisance is Also a CrimeLegislative Declaration-Necessity for.-While equity will not
withhold the remedy of injunctive relief merely because the
acts constituting a nuisance are also of a criminal nature,
:', 'it is loath to interfere where the standards of public policy
can be enforced by resort to the criminal law; and in, the
absence of a legislative declaration to that effect, the courts
should not' broaden the field in which injunctions against
criminal activity will be granted.
[4] Gallling--:-Abatement as Nuisance-Gambling Establishment.
The basis for an action, to restrain the continuance of the
operation of a gambling establishment must be found in the
statutes, rather than by reference to the common law definitions of public nuisance .
[5] Nuisances -.:... Remedies - Pleading - Allegations of Facts.Where an attempt is made to enjoin particular activity upon
the theory that it constitutes a nuisance under general statu,,':
tory provisions, sufficient facts must be alleged so that the
court may conclude that a nuisance exists within the provisions of the statute. Where the legislature has specified the
particular activity which is sought to be enjoined, a general
allegation cannot mislead the defendant as to the nature of
the, case which he is called upon to. answer.
,
[6] Gaming - Abatement as Nuisance --.: Pleading. - A complaint
to restra,in the continuing of the operation of a gambling
establishment is good as against a general demurrer where it
alleges that the gambling house draws together great numbers
of disorderly persons, disturbs the public peace, brings together idle persons, cultivates dissolute habits among them,
creates traffic arid fire hazards, and is thereby injurious to
health, indecent and offensive to the senses and impairs the
free enjoyment of life and property.
. [7] Pleading - Demurrer to Complaint - Grounds - Uncertainty.
A special demurrer toa complaint should not be sustained
3. . Jurisdiction to enjoin an act amounting to a crime, notes,
40 A. L.R., 1145; 91 A . L. R. 315. See, also, 14 Cal. Jur. 21i;
28 Am. Jur. 336.
.,. 7. See 21 Cal. Jut. 102~ 104; 21 R. C. L. 526.

